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Abstract
In this note we answer a question of R. Kaye and H. Kotlarski regarding the
relationship between the schemata of local ω-consistency ω-Con(PA) and local
reflection Rfn(PA) for Peano arithmetic PA. We do this by investigating the
properties of the schema ω-Con(T ) and its partial variants, and characterizing
it in terms of partial reflection principles for T in the style of C. Smoryn´ski’s
characterization of the uniform version of partial ω-consistency principles. We
use this characterization along with the other properties of local ω-consistency
and reflection to establish the key fact that Con(PA + Rfn(PA)) is provable in
PA+ω-Con(PA), implying that ω-Con(PA) does not follow from PA+Rfn(PA).
We also introduce and discuss a modified version of the definable reflection
principle, namely, the schema of uniform reflection with Σn-definable param-
eters.
Keywords: ω-consistency, reflection principles, definable elements.
1 Introduction
A formal theory T is said to be ω-inconsistent if there is a formula ϕ(x) such that
the following two conditions hold simultaneously
(i) T ⊢ ∃xϕ(x),
(ii) T ⊢ ¬ϕ(n) for each natural number n,
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where n is the nth numeral, i.e., the term 0
′...′ with n successor symbols. If this is
not the case, we say that T is ω-consistent. This version of the consistency assertion
was one of the conditions in the original formulation of Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem. Clearly, ω-consistency implies (ordinary) consistency and is implied by the
semantic notion of soundness of T , i.e., the assertion that every theorem of T is true
in the standard model N.
In the contemporary formulations of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems a weaker
condition of Σ1-soundness (which, for sufficiently strong theories T , is equivalent
to the points (i) and (ii) above with ϕ(x) restricted to ∆0-formulas) is often used
instead of ω-consistency.
On the syntactic level, various semantic notions of soundness are usually trans-
lated into the so-called reflection principles. These principles typically express the
following form of soundness
T ⊢ ϕ =⇒ N |= ϕ,
with different conditions being imposed on the formula ϕ and on the notion of prov-
ability in T .
Reflection principles were shown to be a convenient tool for the analysis of formal
theories by demonstrating that many other principles, e.g., induction or different
forms of consistency, can be expressed as some form of reflection and due to the
unboundedness theorems of G. Kreisel and A. Le´vy [9], which allow to conclude
that one formal theory T cannot be axiomatized over another formal theory U by
the arithmetical sentences of a certain logical complexity, whenever T proves the
corresponding form of reflection for U . For a survey of the results on reflection
principles, see C. Smoryn´sky [13] and L. Beklemishev [4].
In particular, C. Smoryn´ski [12] proved that the global ω-consistency assertion
(formulated as a single arithmetical sentence by quantifying over the formulas ϕ(x))
is equivalent to (the uniform) Π3-soundness of a theory T + RFN(T ), where RFN(T )
is the uniform reflection principle for T , formally asserting that for each formula
ϕ(x) and a natural number n we have
T ⊢ ϕ(n) =⇒ N |= ϕ(n).
See also [13, Theorem 4.2.5] for the refined version of this result, where the restricted
variants of uniform ω-consistency are characterized in the same manner.
The schema of local ω-consistency and various kinds of reflection principles for
PA were studied by R. Kaye and H. Kotlarski in [6] from the point of view of ACT-
extensions of models (extensions constructed by the means of the arithmetized com-
pleteness theorem). More specifically, the authors characterize these principles as the
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first-order theories of the class of models of PA having ACT-extensions with certain
model-theoretic properties.
The following questions regarding the relationship between local ω-consistency
ω-Con(PA) and local reflection Rfn(PA) were listed as open in [6].
Problem 8.1. Do there exists models M |= PA+ Rfn(PA) + ¬ω-Con(PA)?
Problem 8.3. Is it true that PA+ Rfn(PA) 6⊢ ω-ConTh(PA)?
Problem 8.4. Over PA, does ω-Con(PA) imply Con(PA+ Rfn(PA))?
For the formal definitions of the ω-consistency and reflection principles mentioned in
these questions see Section 2.
We answer all of these three questions positively by characterizing the schema
ω-Con(T ) and its restricted variants in terms of partial reflection principles for T
in the style of Smoryn´ski (see Theorem 1). Using this characterization along with
the other properties of local ω-consistency and reflection schemata we prove the
main result, Theorem 2, which shows that, in particular, PA + ω-Con(PA) implies
Con(PA + Rfn(PA)), solving Problem 8.4 and, consequently, the other two problems
as well. We also show that the schema ω-ConTh(T ) is equivalent to RFN(T ) (see
Theorem 3). Finally, we introduce a modified variant of the definable reflection
principle considered in [6], namely, the schema of uniform reflection with Σn-definable
parameters and show it to be equivalent to the corresponding form of local reflection.
This fact is then used to give a short model-theoretic proof of the Σn+2-conservativity
of uniform Σn+1-reflection over relativized local Σn+1-reflection (see Theorem 4).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic notions and no-
tation used throughout this note. In Section 3 we prove the main results establishing
the relationship between the local ω-consistency schema and the reflection principles,
and use these results to answer the questions posed above. In Section 4 we introduce
and discuss the schema of uniform reflection with Σn-definable parameters.
2 Preliminaries
In this note we consider first-order theories in the language of arithmetic. As our
basic theory we take Elementary arithmetic EA (sometimes denoted as I∆0(exp)),
that is, the first-order theory formulated in the language 0, (·)′,+,× extended by
the unary function symbol exp for the exponentiation function 2x. It has the stan-
dard defining axioms for these symbols and the induction schema for all elementary
formulas (we also call such formulas bounded), i.e., formulas in the language with
exponent containing only bounded quantifiers. We define classes Σ0 and Π0 to be
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the classes of all elementary (bounded) formulas. After that the classes Σn and Πn
of arithmetical hierarchy are defined in a standard way for all n > 0.
If we allow induction for all arithmetical formulas, the resulting theory is Peano
arithmetic denoted by PA. For a fixed class of arithmetical formulas Γ the fragment
of PA obtained by restricting the induction schema
ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(x+ 1))→ ∀xϕ(x), ϕ(x) ∈ Γ
to Γ-formulas without parameters is denoted by IΓ− and called parameter free Γ-
induction. If, in the schema above ϕ(x), is allowed to contain parameters, then we
obtain the usual Γ-induction schema and the corresponding theory is denoted by IΓ.
We also consider the schema BΣ1 of Σ1-collection
∀x < z ∃y ϕ(x, y, a)→ ∃u ∀x < z ∃y < uϕ(x, y, a), ϕ(x, y, a) ∈ Σ1.
For more details on these theories, see [7].
All the theories considered in this note are supposed to be recursively axiomati-
zable consistent extensions of EA. We assume that some standard arithmetization
of syntax and the go¨delnumbering of syntactic objects has been fixed. In particular,
we write pϕq for the (numeral of the) go¨delnumber of ϕ. As usual, each theory T is
given to us by an elementary formula σT (x), defining the set of axioms of T in the
standard model of arithmetic. The formula σT (x) is used in the construction of the
formula PrfT (y, x) representing the relation “y codes a T -proof of the formula with
go¨delnumber x”. The standard provability predicate for T is given by ∃y PrfT (y, x),
and we denote this formula by ✷T (x). We often write ✷Tϕ instead of ✷T (pϕq) and
use the notation ✸Tϕ for ¬✷T¬ϕ . The sentence ✸T⊤ is the consistency assertion
for T and is also denoted by Con(T ).
The predicate ✷T satisfies Lo¨b’s derivability conditions provably in EA (cf. [4]):
1. If T ⊢ ϕ, then EA ⊢ ✷Tϕ.
2. EA ⊢ ✷T (ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷Tϕ→ ✷Tψ).
3. EA ⊢ ✷Tϕ→ ✷T✷Tϕ.
Point 3 follows from the general fact known as provable Σ1-completeness :
EA ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xm (σ(x1, . . . , xm)→ ✷T pσ(x1, . . . , xm)q) ,
whenever σ(x1, . . . , xm) is a Σ1-formula. Here the underline notation pϕ(x)q stands
for the elementarily definable term, representing the elementary function that maps
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k to the go¨delnumber pϕ(k)q. In what follows we usually write just ✷Tϕ(x) instead
of ✷T pϕ(x)q.
If two theories T and U have the same theorems, we say that they are deductively
equivalent and denote this by T ≡ U . If they prove the same arithmetical sentences
of complexity Γ, we write T ≡Γ U .
In this note we are mainly interested in the following three principles (or schemata)
for a given arithmetical theory T :
• local ω-consistency ω-Con(T ):
∀x1, . . . , xn✷Tϕ(x1, . . . , xn)→ ✸T∀x1, . . . , xn ϕ(x1, . . . , xn),
for each arithmetical formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn);
• local reflection Rfn(T ):
✷Tϕ→ ϕ,
for each arithmetical sentence ϕ;
• uniform reflection RFN(T ):
∀x1, . . . , xn (✷Tϕ(x1, . . . , xn)→ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)) ,
for each arithmetical formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn).
For a more detailed analysis of the principles above we also consider their partial
variants, which are obtained by imposing the restriction ϕ ∈ Γ, where Γ is some class
of arithmetical formulas (usually, Σn or Πn). Corresponding partial principles are
denoted by ω-ConΓ(T ), RfnΓ(T ) and RFNΓ(T ), respectively.
Note that, in the definitions of ω-Con(T ) and RFN(T ) (and their partial ana-
logues), by using sequence coding functions, we can, equivalently, restrict these
schemata to the formulas ϕ(x) with a single free variable x.
In [6] the authors have also considered the following schema ω-ConTh(T ) (note
that we use slightly different notation), which is a strengthening of ω-Con(T ),
• local ω-consistency of the theory of the model ω-ConTh(T ):
σ ∧ ∀x✷T (σ → ϕ(x))→ ✸T (σ ∧ ∀xϕ(x)),
for each arithmetical formula ϕ(x) with a single free variable x and arithmetical
sentence σ.
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It is shown that ω-ConTh(PA) implies Rfn(PA) (take ϕ(x) to be x = x) and is implied
by RFN(PA).
In what follows, when arguing about the principles introduced above, we freely
use their dual forms without specifically mentioning it, e.g., RfnΣn(T ) is equivalent to
pi → ✸Tpi,
where pi is a Πn-sentence, and ω-ConΣn(T ) is equivalent to
✷T∃x pi(x)→ ∃x✸Tpi(x),
where pi(x) is Πn-formula.
Throughout this note we often use the following principle known as the small
reflection (formalized in EA). We include a proof of this important principle for the
sake of completeness.
Proposition 2.1. For each formula ϕ(x)
EA ⊢ ∀x, y✷T
(
PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x)
)
.
Proof. By weakening PrfT to ✷T , we get
EA ⊢ PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ✷Tϕ(x)
→ ✷T
(
PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x)
)
.
On the other hand, by provable Σ1-completeness
EA ⊢ ¬PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ✷T
(
¬PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)
)
→ ✷T
(
PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x)
)
,
whence the result follows.
It is known that for each n > 0 there exists an arithmetical Πn-formula TrueΠn(x)
(known as a truth definition for Πn-formulas) such that
EA ⊢ ∀x1, . . . , xm (ϕ(x1, . . . , xm)↔ TrueΠn(pϕ(x1, . . . , xm)q)),
for every Πn-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xm), and this fact itself is formalizable in EA, so
EA ⊢ ∀pi ∈ Πn✷T (pi ↔ TrueΠn(pi)) .
Using these properties, it is not hard to check that over EA, the schema RFNΣn(T )
is equivalent to its universal instance with ϕ(x) taken to be ¬TrueΠn(x).
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3 Local ω-consistency and reflection
In this section we study the partial local ω-consistency principles ω-ConΣn(T ). We
start by proving several useful properties and obtaining the characterization of these
schemata in terms of partial reflection principles, analogous to that of Smoryn´ski
(Theorem 1). The main result of this section is Theorem 2, which allows us to
answer all the questions posed in the introduction. In addition, we prove that the
schema ω-ConTh(T ) is actually equivalent to RFN(T ) (Theorem 3).
It is known that partial uniform reflection principles satisfy the equivalence
RFNΠn+1(T ) ≡ RFNΣn(T ) for each n > 0 (see [4, Lemma 2.4]). We prove the same
result for partial local ω-consistency principles.
Proposition 3.1. Over EA, ω-ConΠn+1(T ) ≡ ω-ConΣn(T ) for each n > 0.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary Πn+1-formula ∀y ϕ(x, y) with a single free variable x (see the
remark above about formulas with several variables), where ϕ(x, y) ∈ Σn. We derive
EA+ ω-ConΣn(T ) ⊢ ∀x✷T∀y ϕ(x, y)→ ∀x, y✷Tϕ(x, y)
→ ✸T∀x, y ϕ(x, y),
where the last implication follows from the corresponding axiom of ω-ConΣn(T ).
The next proposition shows how much reflection is sufficient to derive ω-ConΣn(T ).
Proposition 3.2. EA+ RFNΣn(T ) + RfnΣn+1(T ) ⊢ ω-ConΣn(T ) for each n > 0.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary Σn-formula ϕ(x). We have
EA+ RFNΣn(T ) + RfnΣn+1(T ) ⊢ ∀x✷Tϕ(x)→ ∀xϕ(x)
→ ✸T∀xϕ(x).
Corollary 3.3. For each n > 0,
(i) EA+ RFNΣn+1(T ) ⊢ ω-ConΣn(T ).
(ii) EA+ RFN(T ) ⊢ ω-Con(T ).
The following theorem provides the characterization of local ω-consistency princi-
ples in terms of partial reflection principles for T . It can be seen as a direct analogue
of a theorem due to Smoryn´ski [13, Theorem 4.2.5], where the corresponding results
about uniform ω-consistency assertions are obtained.
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Theorem 1. Over EA,
(i) ω-ConΣn(T ) ≡ RfnΣ2(T + RFNΣn(T )) for each n > 0,
(ii) ω-ConΣ0(T ) ≡ RfnΣ1(T ).
Proof. (i) Fix a Πn-formula pi(x) with a single free variable x. Using the axiom
∀x (pi(x)→ ✸Tpi(x)) of RFNΣn(T ) under ✷T+RFNΣn (T ) we derive
EA+ RfnΣ2(T + RFNΣn(T )) ⊢ ✷T∃x pi(x)→ ✷T+RFNΣn (T )∃x pi(x)
→ ✷T+RFNΣn (T )∃x✸Tpi(x)
→ ∃x✸Tpi(x),
where the last implication uses local Σ2-reflection. Now, we prove that for each
formula ∀xσ(x), where σ(x) is a Σ1-formula, we have
EA+ ω-ConΣn(T ) ⊢ ∀xσ(x)→ ✸T+RFNΣn (T )∀xσ(x).
Assuming ϕ(x) to be a Σn-formula, we use provable Σ1-completeness and small
reflection principle as follows
EA+ ω-ConΣn(T ) ⊢ ∀xσ(x)→ ∀x✷Tσ(x) ∧ ∀y, z✷T
(
PrfT (z, pϕ(y)q)→ ϕ(y)
)
→ ∀x, y, z✷T
(
σ(x) ∧
(
PrfT (z, pϕ(y)q)→ ϕ(y)
))
→ ✸T
(
∀x, y, z
(
σ(x) ∧
(
PrfT (z, pϕ(y)q)→ ϕ(y)
)))
→ ✸T
(
∀xσ(x) ∧ ∀y
(
✷Tϕ(y)→ ϕ(y)
))
,
where the third implication uses local ω-consistency for the Σn-formula under ✷T in
the second line. The final formula is equivalent to ✸T+RFNΣn (T )∀xσ(x), if we take
ϕ(y) to be ¬TrueΠn(y) for n > 0.
(ii) For Σ0-formula δ(x) we have
EA+ ω-ConΣ0(T ) ⊢ ∀x δ(x)→ ∀x✷T δ(x)
→ ✸T∀x δ(x).
Conversely, we argue by contraposition
EA+ RfnΣ1(T ) ⊢ ✷T∃x¬δ(x) ∧ ∀x✷T δ(x)→ ∃x¬δ(x) ∧ ∀x✷T δ(x)
→ ∃x✷T¬δ(x) ∧ ∀x✷T δ(x)
→ ∃x✷T (¬δ(x) ∧ δ(x))
→ ✷T⊥
→ ⊥,
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where the first and the last implications use RfnΣ1(T ). As a result, we get
EA+ RfnΣ1(T ) ⊢ ∀x✷T δ(x)→ ✸T∀x δ(x).
Corollary 3.4. Over EA, ω-Con(T ) ≡
⋃
n<ω
RfnΣ2(T + RFNΣn(T )).
The above characterization together with Corollary 3.3 yields the following
Proposition 3.5. EA+ ω-ConΣn+1(T ) ⊢ Con(T + ω-ConΣn(T )) for each n > 0.
Proof. By Theorem 1 we have
EA+ ω-ConΣn+1(T ) ⊢ RfnΣ2(T + RFNΣn+1(T )),
whence, in particular, EA+ ω-ConΣn+1(T ) ⊢ Con(T + RFNΣn+1(T )).
Point (i) of Corollary 3.3 can be formalized in EA and strengthened to get
EA ⊢ ∀ϕ
(
✷T+ω-ConΣn (T )
ϕ→ ✷T+RFNΣn+1 (T )ϕ
)
. (1)
To see this, observe that the proof of Corollary 3.3 goes by showing that each axiom
of T +ω-ConΣn(T ) is provable in T +RFNΣn+1(T ), and this fact is formalizable in EA.
Using Σ1-collection schema (see [3, Proposition 5.1] for the analogous argument), we
conclude that each theorem of T + ω-ConΣn(T ) is provable in T + RFNΣn+1(T ), i.e.,
EA+ BΣ1 ⊢ ∀ϕ
(
✷T+ω-ConΣn (T )
ϕ→ ✷T+RFNΣn+1 (T )ϕ
)
,
Now, using Π2-conservativity of EA + BΣ1 over EA (see [1, Corrolary 4.1]), this
yields (1). Taking ϕ to be ⊥ in (1) we get
EA ⊢ Con(T + RFNΣn+1(T ))→ Con(T + ω-ConΣn(T )),
whence EA+ ω-ConΣn+1(T ) ⊢ Con(T + ω-ConΣn(T )), as required.
In view of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, Proposition 3.5 and Theorem 1
imply that the hierarchy of partial local ω-consistency principles ω-ConΣn(T ) does
not collapse if and only if T + ω-Con(T ) is consistent. We also have the following
Proposition 3.6. T + ω-Con(T ) is equiconsistent with T + RFN(T ).
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Proof. By Corollary 3.3 the consistency of T +RFN(T ) implies that of T +ω-Con(T ).
Now, assume T + RFN(T ) is inconsistent. Then the theory T + RFNΣn(T ) is incon-
sistent for some n > 0, whence, by Σ1-completeness, EA ⊢ ¬Con(T + RFNΣn(T )),
but also by Theorem 1, EA+ ω-Con(T ) ⊢ Con(T + RFNΣn(T )), so EA+ ω-Con(T ) is
inconsistent.
The following theorem is another consequence of the characterization of ω-Con(T ).
Theorem 2. EA+ ω-ConΣ1(T ) ⊢ Con(T + Rfn(T )).
Proof. Lemma 3.5 from [8] for n = 0 (which is essentially a formalization of the fact
that Rfn(T ) is contained in T together with all true Π1-sentences) implies that
EA ⊢ Con(T + RFNΣ1(T ))→ Con(T + Rfn(T )),
and by point (i) of Theorem 1 we have EA + ω-ConΣ1(T ) ⊢ Con(T + RFNΣ1(T )),
whence the result follows.
In particular, PA+ ω-ConΣ1(PA) ⊢ Con(PA+ Rfn(PA)), which solves Problem 8.4
and, consequently, Problems 8.1 and 8.3 as well, because then
PA+ Rfn(PA) 6⊢ ω-Con(PA),
by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, whence, certainly,
PA+ Rfn(PA) 6⊢ ω-ConTh(PA).
Recall from Section 2 that ω-ConTh(PA) is implied by RFN(PA). We prove that
these two schemata are equivalent for an arbitrary theory T , which provides an
alternative solution to Problem 8.3.
Theorem 3. Over EA, ω-ConTh(T ) ≡ RFN(T ).
Proof. To derive ω-ConTh(T ) from RFN(T ) argue as follows
EA+ RFN(T ) ⊢ σ ∧ ∀x✷T (σ → ϕ(x))→ σ ∧ ∀x (σ → ϕ(x))
→ σ ∧ ∀xϕ(x)
→ ✸T (σ ∧ ∀xϕ(x)),
where the first and the last implications use RFN(T ).
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To show the converse fix a formula ϕ(x) with a single free variable x and let σ be
the sentence ¬∀x (✷Tϕ(x)→ ϕ(x)), i.e., the negation of the corresponding instance
of RFN(T ). We derive ¬σ using contraposition and small reflection
EA+ ω-ConTh(T ) ⊢ σ →
[
σ ∧ ∀x, y✷T
(
PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x)
)]
→
[
σ ∧ ∀x, y✷T
(
σ →
(
PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x)
))]
→ ✸T (σ ∧ ∀x, y
(
PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x)
)
)
→ ✸T (σ ∧ ¬σ)
→ ✸T⊥,
whence EA+ ω-ConTh(T ) ⊢ ✷T⊤ → ¬σ and EA+ ω-Con
Th(T ) ⊢ ¬σ, so
EA+ ω-ConTh(T ) ⊢ RFN(T ).
In particular, PA+Rfn(PA) 6⊢ ω-ConTh(PA), since PA+Rfn(PA) 6⊢ RFN(PA), which
provides an alternative solution to Problem 8.3.
To formulate these corollaries for an arbitrary theory T in place of PA we recall
the following definition. A theory T is said to have infinite characteristic, if the
theory Tω is consistent, where
T0 := T, Tn+1 := Tn + Con(Tn), Tω :=
⋃
n<ω
Tn.
The following two facts are known about this notion (see Corollary 2.38 and Corollary
2.35 in [4]):
1. T + Rfn(T ) 6⊢ RFN(T ) for a theory T of infinite characteristic.
2. T + Rfn(T ) is equiconsistent with Tω.
The first fact together with Theorem 3 yields the following
Corollary 3.7. For each theory T of infinite characteristic
T + Rfn(T ) 6⊢ ω-ConTh(T ).
The second fact together with Theorem 2 and Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem gives a stronger result.
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Corollary 3.8. For each theory T of infinite characteristic
T + Rfn(T ) 6⊢ ω-ConΣ1(T ).
Our characterizations also yield the following unboundedness results for the local
ω-consistency principles (see Corollary 2.22 (i) and Corollary 2.17 (ii) in [4]).
Corollary 3.9. For each n > 0,
(i) ω-ConΣn(T ) (and, consequently, ω-Con(T )) is not contained in any consistent
r.e. extension of T + RFNΣn(T ) of arithmetical complexity Π2.
(ii) ω-ConTh(T ) is not contained in any consistent extension of T of bounded arith-
metical complexity.
4 Reflection with definable parameters
In [6] the authors have also introduced an intermediate reflection schema (we formu-
late it in a dual form, which is actually used in the proofs there) called
• definable reflection DRfn(T )
∀x (ϕ(x) ∧ ∀y (ϕ(y)→ y = x)→ ✸T [ϕ(x) ∧ ∀y (ϕ(y)→ y = x)]) ,
for each arithmetical formula ϕ(x) with a single free variable x.
It was shown that DRfn(PA) is actually equivalent to RFN(PA) using indicators. Let
us include a proof of this fact without using indicators (note the change of the base
theory to PA, since we use induction).
Proposition 4.1. Over PA, DRfn(T ) ≡ RFN(T ).
Proof. Clearly, EA+ RFN(T ) ⊢ DRfn(T ). Fix a formula ϕ(x) and let
ψ(x, y) := PrfT (y, pϕ(x)q)→ ϕ(x).
We show that PA + DRfn(T ) ⊢ ∀x, y ψ(x, y). Arguing informally in PA, assume
∃x, y ¬ψ(x, y). By the least element principle ∃z δ(z), where δ(z) asserts that z
codes the least pair 〈x, y〉 satisfying ¬ψ(x, y), so
PA+ DRfn(T ) ⊢ ∃x, y ¬ψ(x, y)→ ∃z δ(z)
→ ∃z (δ(z) ∧ ∀u (δ(u)→ u = z))
→ ∃z✸T (δ(z) ∧ ∀u (δ(u)→ u = z)) ,
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where the last implication uses DRfn(T ). Since δ(z) implies ¬ψ((z)0, (z)1) we get
PA+ DRfn(T ) ⊢ ∃x, y ¬ψ(x, y)→ ∃z✸T¬ψ((z)0, (z)1),
which contradicts the small reflection principle PA ⊢ ∀z✷Tψ((z)0, (z)1), whence
PA+ DRfn(T ) ⊢ ∃x, y ¬ψ(x, y)→ ⊥,
and PA+ DRfn(T ) ⊢ ∀x, y ψ(x, y), which shows that PA+ DRfn(T ) ⊢ RFN(T ).
In this section we consider a refined version of the definable reflection principle,
namely, uniform reflection with Σn-definable parameters, and use it to give a model-
theoretic proof of the Σn+2-conservativity of uniform reflection over relativized local
reflection (Theorem 4). We also discuss a relationship between these principles and
the schemata of induction with definable parameters introduced by A. Cordo´n-Franco
et al. in [5].
Recall the uniform Σk-reflection principle RFNΣk(T ):
∀x (✷Tϕ(x)→ ϕ(x)) ,
where ϕ(x) is a Σk-formula. If we require the variable x above to range only over
the standard elements (numerals), then we get the schema that is equivalent to local
reflection RfnΣk(T ). We investigate the question: can we expand the range of x to
some nonstandard elements while still obtaining the equivalent schema?
Formally, we define the following schema of
• uniform Σk-reflection with Σn-definable parameters RFN
Kn
Σk
(T ):
∀x (Defδ(x)→ (✷Tϕ(x)→ ϕ(x))) ,
for each Σn-formula δ(x) and Σk-formula ϕ(x), where
Defδ(x) := δ(x) ∧ ∀y, z (δ(y) ∧ δ(z)→ y = z)
is the formula asserting that x is the unique element satisfying δ(x).
We aim at proving that these reflection principles are equivalent to their local coun-
terparts. To cover the case n > 1 we need to introduce the notion of n-provability
and corresponding local reflection principles. The following formula
[n]Tϕ := ∃pi (TrueΠn(pi) ∧ ✷T (pi → ϕ)) ,
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defines the predicate of n-provability, i.e., usual provability in T together with all
true Πn-sentences taken as additional axioms. The predicate [n]T satisfies the same
derivability conditions as ✷T and is provably Σn+1-complete (see [4]).
The relativized local reflection principles RfnnΓ(T ) are defined analogously to RfnΓ(T )
but with n-provability predicate [n]T instead of the usual provability ✷T .
Proposition 4.2. For each k > n > 0 we have EA+ RfnnΣk(T ) ⊢ RFN
Kn+1
Σk
(T ).
Proof. Fix some Σn+1-formula δ(x) and Σk-formula ϕ(x). We will derive the corre-
sponding axiom of RFNK
n+1
Σk
(T ). Using provable Σn+1-completeness and an instance
of RfnnΣk(T ) for the Σk-sentence ∃u (δ(u) ∧ ϕ(u)) (we use n < k here) we derive
EA+ RfnnΣk(T ) ⊢ Defδ(x) ∧✷Tϕ(x)→ [n]T δ(x) ∧✷Tϕ(x)
→ [n]T (δ(x) ∧ ϕ(x))
→ [n]T∃u (δ(u) ∧ ϕ(u))
→ ∃u (δ(u) ∧ ϕ(u)).
Since EA ⊢ Defδ(x) ∧ δ(u)→ x = u, we get
EA+ RfnnΣk(T ) ⊢ Defδ(x) ∧ δ(u) ∧ ϕ(u)→ (x = u) ∧ ϕ(u)
→ ϕ(x),
whence EA+ RfnnΣk(T ) ⊢ (Defδ(x) ∧ ∃u (δ(u) ∧ ϕ(u)))→ ϕ(x), and so
EA+ RfnnΣk(T ) ⊢ Defδ(x)→ (✷Tϕ(x)→ ϕ(x)) ,
as required.
In particular, the local Σk-reflection is equivalent to the uniform Σk-reflection
with Σ1-definable parameters.
Corollary 4.3. For each k > 0 over EA, RfnΣk(T ) ≡ RFN
K1
Σk
(T ).
Proof. By Proposition 4.2 it suffices to show that EA + RFNK
1
Σk
(T ) ⊢ ✷Tϕ → ϕ,
where ϕ is a Σk-sentence. Define δ(x) to be the formula (x = 0) and consider the
corresponding axiom of RFNK
1
Σk
(T ). Note that EA ⊢ Defδ(0), whence, by instantiating
the axiom with 0, we obtain ✷Tϕ→ ϕ.
Let us recall several notions related to the models of arithmetic (for more details,
see [7]). Given a model M and a natural number n we denote by Kn(M) the
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substructure ofM consisting of all Σn-definable elements without parameters. Given
a substructure N ⊆ M , we say that N is a Σn-elementary substructure (denoted
N ≺Σn M) if and only if for each Σn-formula σ(x1, . . . , xm) and a1, . . . am ∈ N
N |= σ(a1, . . . , am)⇐⇒M |= σ(a1, . . . , am).
The models Kn+1(M) possess the following useful property (see Remark (i) after
Theorem 2.1 in [7]).
Lemma 4.4. For each n > 0, Kn+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M , whenever M |= IΣ
−
n .
We have the following generalization of Corollary 4.3.
Proposition 4.5. For each k > n > 0 over EA+ IΣ−n , Rfn
n
Σk
(T ) ≡ RFNK
n+1
Σk
(T ).
Proof. By Proposition 4.2 EA + RfnnΣk(T ) ⊢ RFN
Kn+1
Σk
(T ), so we only prove the con-
verse implication (over EA + IΣ−n ). Fix some Σk-sentence σ and a model M of
EA + IΣ−n + RFN
Kn+1
Σk
(T ). We will show that M |= [n]Tσ → σ, whence the result
follows, so assume M |= [n]Tσ. By Lemma 4.4 we have K
n+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M , imply-
ing Kn+1(M) |= [n]Tσ, since [n]Tσ is a Σn+1-sentence. It follows that there exists a
pi ∈ Kn+1(M) such that
Kn+1(M) |= TrueΠn(pi) ∧✷T (pi → σ).
Using Kn+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M again, we get M |= TrueΠn(pi) ∧✷T (pi → σ), whence
M |= TrueΠn(pi) ∧ ✷T (TrueΠn(pi)→ σ), (2)
since EA ⊢ ∀pi ∈ Πn✷T (pi ↔ TrueΠn(pi)) and M |= EA. Let δ(x) be a Σn+1-formula
such that M |= Defδ(pi). We have
M |= Defδ(pi) ∧✷T (TrueΠn(pi)→ σ).
Now, since TrueΠn(pi)→ σ is a Σk-formula, we can use RFN
Kn+1
Σk
(T ) in M to obtain
M |= TrueΠn(pi)→ σ,
whence M |= σ, as required, since M |= TrueΠn(pi) by (2).
Now we can give a relatively short model-theoretic proof of the following conse-
quence of the so-called reduction property (see [3, Proposition 4.6]).
15
Theorem 4. If U is a Πn+2-axiomatized extension of EA, then
U + RFNΣn+1(T ) ≡Σn+2 U + Rfn
n
Σn+1(T ).
Proof. The inclusion ⊇ is clear from the definitions of the schemata and [n]T , so we
only prove the converse. Assume U + RFNΣn+1(T ) ⊢ σ, where σ is a Σn+2-sentence.
Fix an arbitrary modelM |= U+RfnnΣn+1(T ). We will show thatM |= σ. By Theorem
1 (i) in [2], EA + RfnnΣn+1(EA) ⊢ IΣ
−
n , whence, certainly, U + Rfn
n
Σn+1(T ) ⊢ IΣ
−
n , and
so, in particular, M |= EA+ IΣ−n . Lemma 4.4 then implies K
n+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M .
We have Kn+1(M) |= U , since M |= U and U is a Πn+2-extension (the truth of
Πn+2-sentences is preserved downwards by the relation ≺Σn+1). We will show that
Kn+1(M) |= RFNΣn+1(T ). In this case K
n+1(M) |= U +RFNΣn+1(T ), whence, by the
assumption, Kn+1(M) |= σ, so M |= σ, as required, since σ is a Σn+2-sentence (the
truth of Σn+2-sentences is preserved upwards by the relation ≺Σn+1).
The rest of the proof is close to that of Proposition 4.5. Aiming for a con-
tradiction, assume Kn+1(M) 6|= RFNΣn+1(T ), i.e., there exists a Σn+1-formula ϕ(x)
and an element a ∈ Kn+1(M) with Kn+1(M) |= ✷Tϕ(a) ∧ ¬ϕ(a), which, using
Kn+1(M) ≺Σn+1 M , implies
M |= ✷Tϕ(a) ∧ ¬ϕ(a). (3)
Let δ(x) be a Σn+1-formula such that M |= Defδ(a). Since M |= EA + Rfn
n
Σn+1(T ),
Proposition 4.2 implies that M |= RFNK
n+1
Σn+1
(T ) and, in particular,
M |= Defδ(a)→ (✷Tϕ(a)→ ϕ(a)),
since ϕ(x) is a Σn+1-formula. Together with (3) this yields M |= ϕ(a), which con-
tradicts M |= ¬ϕ(a) in (3).
Let us also note the following relationship between Proposition 4.5 and the fol-
lowing proposition proved in [5, Proposition 4.1] (we use slightly different notation).
Proposition 4.6. For each n > 0 over EA+ IΣ−n ,
IΠ−n+1 ≡ I(Σ
−
n+1, K
n+1) ≡ I(Σn+1, I
n+1, Kn+11 ).
Here I(Σ−n+1, K
n+1) is the local variant of Σn+1-induction schema, where the con-
clusion of the induction axiom is relativized to Σn+1-definable elements (for the
formal definitions of this schema and I(Σn+1, I
n+1, Kn+11 ), see [5]). Thus, Proposition
4.5 can be seen as an analogue of Proposition 4.6 but for the reflection principles
instead of the induction schemata.
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The connection between the two propositions is based on the following fact (see
[2, Theorem 1 (ii)] for n > 0 and [5, Theorem 5.2] for n = 0), for each n > 0
IΠ−n+1 ≡ EA+ Rfn
n
Σn+2
(EA).
In view of this result, Propositions 4.5 and 4.6 we have the following
Corollary 4.7. For each n > 0 over EA+ IΣ−n ,
RFN
Kn+1
Σn+2
(EA) ≡ I(Σ−n+1, K
n+1) ≡ I(Σn+1, I
n+1, Kn+11 ).
This may be contrasted with the famous result by D. Leivant [10] and H. Ono
[11] (cf. [4, Theorem 7]), that EA + RFNΣn+2(EA) ≡ IΣn+1 for each n > 0, and a
result by L. Beklemishev (see [2, Theorem 1 (i)]), that EA + Rfnn+1Σn+2(EA) ≡ IΣ
−
n+1
for each n > 0. In our case we also have the equivalence between certain forms of
Σn+2-reflection for EA and Σn+1-induction, namely, for the versions of reflection and
induction restricted to Σn+1-definable elements.
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